The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on January 1, 2005 aimed to improve the quality of financial reporting in Greece, which had been regularly criticized for the practice of earnings management and the ineffectiveness of external auditing. However, the unusual characteristics of the economic environment and institutional setting of code-law oriented Greece, has made the attempt even more challenging. To investigate the role of auditors in potentially approving managers' opportunistic behaviour in the post-IFRS period, we examine the relationship between earnings management, measured by signed discretionary accruals, and auditor reporting, measured by audit firm size (Big 4 vs.
Introduction
Greece has often been in the spotlight for the inadequate quality of financial reporting. Before the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to all consolidated and individual accounts of publicly traded firms beginning on January 1, 2005, the quality of Greek accounting standards and disclosure practices had been criticized in the European financial press and investors' community. Some of the complaints were that Greek accounting standards allowed firms to use too much discretion, lacked detailed disclosures, were designed to satisfy the information needs of users, permitted reporting that was too heavily influenced by tax avoidance strategies, and had no effective enforcement mechanisms.
Empirical studies of international comparison among countries have illustrated that Greece exhibits the highest level of earnings management and opacity (Bhattacharya, Daouk, & Welker, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) .
The practice of earnings management indicates a breakdown in the financial reporting process (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004) . When in doubt of the reliability of financial statements, users turn their attention to the auditor's report. Theoretically, external auditors play a key role as a monitoring mechanism in assuring the integrity of accounting figures and in reducing the agency costs, resulting from managers' opportunistic incentives. 1 However, the effectiveness of external auditing in Greece has also been questioned by various parties, i.e. finance institutions, investors, journalists, and politicians (Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 2011) .
In this study, we aim to investigate the relationship between earnings management and auditor reporting for firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the post-IFRS period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . While research on earnings management is abundant, the role of auditors in potentially approving managers' opportunistic behaviour needs to be further investigated.
To address this research question we focus on Greece for two reasons. First, it is interesting to investigate if code-law oriented Greece, criticized for the inadequate quality of financial and auditor reporting, has made improvements after the adoption of IFRS, which are designed to 1 Other monitoring mechanisms identified in the literature are the composition and characteristics of the board of directors and audit committees (Peasnell, Pope, & Young 2005; Lee & Mande 2005; Lee, Ortman, & Mande 2004; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt 2003; Klein 2002; Beasley 1996) and ownership structure (Chung, Firth, & Kim 2002) . Incentives range from bonus plans (Shuto 2007; Balsam 1998; Gaver & Gaver 1998; Baber, Kang, & Kumar 1998) , avoidance of debt covenant violations (Sweeney 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994) , insider trading (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Beneish & Vargus 2002) to meeting analysts' and management's forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames 2006; DeGeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser 1999). provide more useful financial statements, compared to the legalistic, politically and taxinfluenced standards that historically have characterized Continental Europe (Ball, 2006) . Second, Greece is a small country that has undergone serious reforms over the last few years. The Greek economy was affected by the global recession, which began in 2007, and showed the first signs of sovereign debt crisis in 2009. In 2010 the concerns intensified, the crisis deepened and the public debt became unsustainable. The country turned to the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for financial support, which included 'rescue packages', conditional on the implementation of harsh austerity measures, such as restrictive income policy and drastic limitation of public expenses. The financial problems of Greece have spread to other weak economies in the European Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. Ireland and Portugal, and the contagion effect has become a perceived problem for the whole EU. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate various financial aspects of such a small country, which threatens the stability of the EU.
We use signed discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, and as proxies for auditor reporting we use audit firm size (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), and audit opinion type (unqualified vs. qualified).
2 Specifically, since the purpose of an external audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we examine if there are observable differences in discretionary accruals between clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. 3 Then, we investigate if there is a difference in the type of audit report issued in response to the level of discretionary accruals possibly employed by a firm. As an additional test, we examine whether the auditor's propensity to issue a qualified report is similar for Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. As Arnedo, Lizarraga, and Sanchez (2008) 4 state, a re-examination of these relationships is justified if we consider recent findings, which suggest that Big 4 auditors act less conservatively in countries with less restrictive regulations or in countries where stakeholders make lower demands for the quality of auditing.
Our results reveal that auditors, either Big 4 or non-Big 4, have weak incentives to prevent earnings management, and the audit opinion qualification is not issued in response to management's opportunistic behaviour. As for the additional test, Big 4 auditors have a 2 These proxies are typically termed as audit quality attributes and are used interchangeably throughout the study.
greater propensity to issue unqualified reports, which is attributed to client characteristics and not to auditor size. In sum, IFRS implementation has not alleviated the influences of the economic environment and institutional setting of Greece in the auditor and financial reporting process.
The findings can provide insights to investors, who have become the major target of the Greek government policy. From the early stages of the crisis, the Greek government realized that the attraction of foreign direct and indirect investments could assist the Greek economy to overcome the financial sovereign crisis. 5 A series of reforms aimed at the development of a more attractive investment and business environment, including liberalization of a number of markets, faster licensing procedures, flexibility in the labour market, competitive real estate prices, new Investment Law, as well as a reduction in the cost of production. Consequently, investors who consult financial statements when they consider entering the Greek market should be aware of these relationships; 6 they can rely on the auditor's report to make inferences about financial reporting quality, but the report is valuable to them only to the extent that is accurate, relevant and reliable (Ryu & Rho, 2007) .
Furthermore, standard setters and regulators should be conscious of the fact that to accomplish international harmonization of auditing and financial reporting, the distinctive characteristics of each country need to be examined carefully. There must also be appropriate country level incentives and enforcement mechanisms. Francis and Wang (2006) state that enforcement mechanisms may matter more than a country's accounting standards in shaping earnings and audit quality. It is apparent that, despite IFRS implementation, earnings management still exists, and auditors also may behave opportunistically. Therefore, regulators have to enact standards and rules that limit the opportunistic behaviours of both.
Additionally, the study contributes to the literature of earnings management and auditing since these relations have not received considerable attention in Greece, and the findings from common-law countries may not be applicable. Our study is one of the first to examine earnings management and the role of auditors in the post IFRS period for a five-year sample. Finally, it is the first time that the cross-sectional modified-Jones model with cash flow from operations (CFO) (Larcker & Richardson, 2004) and the cross-sectional modifiedJones model with prior year return on assets (ROA) (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) are applied in Greece.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Greek setting is described. Section 3 presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 4 outlines the research design, while Section 5 describes the sample and data. In Section 6 the empirical results are presented. Section 7 includes sensitivity tests and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Background

Cultural factors
Greece is a Euro-Continental, code law country. It shares similar attributes with other Euro-Continental countries but also has some unusual national features. During the last few decades, Greece has been modernized, but Greek culture, politics and economics remain Consistent with the cultural values outlined by Hofstede (1980 , 1991 ) and Gray (1988 , Greece is characterized by high statutory control, uniformity, conservatism and uncertainty avoidance. In fact, in Hofstede's research, Greece appears as an outlier in terms of uncertainty avoidance, and also scores highly in power distance and masculinity (Ballas, Skoutela, & Tzovas 2010) . Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008) rank Greece third, after Venezuela and Portugal, in terms of secrecy, first, along with Colombia, in ownership concentration, and first as the most uncertainty avoiding country in their sample. Similarly, in Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007) , Greece has the highest score of uncertainty avoidance among 50 countries.
Corporate environment
The family firm has been an important and common form of business organization in Greece, where ownership is concentrated and closely tied to a group of people (Spanos, Tsipouri, & Xanthakis 2008) . Typically, family members are also board members and executives, and are involved in the direct management of the firm (Spanos et al. 2008) . Managers in such firms communicate information regarding their performance directly to their superior ownermanagers, without having to rely upon financial statements (Tzovas 2006) .
In this business setting, banks are the major source of financing. In many instances, the banks obtain directly all financial information required, without having to rely upon publicly disclosed data since they develop close personal relations with the owners of the firm. In some cases, they own part of the firm's share capital (Tzovas 2006) . As expected, banks do not always base their credit decisions on entirely objective financial data.
Consequently, the importance of public accounting information is further diminished (Tzovas 2006 ).
In the late 1990s, the significant use of initial public offerings (IPO) as a means of raising capital turned many firms from private-family owned to publicly listed firms (Spanos 2005) , without changing the fact that the main shareholder, the family, may still hold the majority of the firm's equity capital (Lazarides 2010) . Although improvements in corporate governance have occurred, empirical studies reveal that they are primarily confined to a small number of large listed firms (Spanos et al. 2008) . Chalevas and Tzovas (2010) suggest that the introduction of corporate governance mechanisms had a limited impact upon crucial corporate issues. For example, the extent to which managers attempt to manipulate firm's earnings has not been affected considerably 
Accounting framework -IFRS
The Greek accounting system has been stakeholder oriented, tax-driven, and conservative (Spathis & Georgakopoulou 2007; Ballas 1994) . The income tax rate is perceived to be unfairly high and many firms attempt to pay the least taxes by exploiting or violating the law with tax evasion strategies, creative accounting and earnings management (Baralexis 2004 ).
Greece ranks 19 th among 50 countries in tax evasion, following the less developed Latin and near Eastern European areas (Tsakumis et al. 2007 ).
Firms have to prepare two different sets of accounts for accounting and tax purposes.
This requirement creates a cost-benefit trade-off in the firm's accounting policy decisions. A preference for higher tax-savings results in lower reported profit figures, which in turn, may influence unfavourably the cost of capital of the firm, i.e. the bank's credit decisions, and the share price of the firm (Tzovas 2006) . Considering the fact that, in Greece, accounting figures have a dominant influence on a firm's share price, firms are more likely to adopt income increasing accounting policies, regardless of the important tax costs associated with this decision (Tzovas 2006) . In other words, the cost of profit overstatement, which is higher income taxes, is less than the benefit derived from such overstatement (Baralexis 2004 ). Even so, there are few listed firms that understate, rather than overstate profit (Baralexis 2004) .
Greece was among the first adopters of IFRS in the EU (Ballas et al. 2010 ). Hope, Jin and Kang (2006) document that countries with weak shareholder protection bond themselves to superior accounting standards, in order to improve disclosure policies and accounting systems, to enhance the integration of domestic markets into world markets, and to accelerate economic growth. However, higher-quality standards do not automatically lead to higherquality financial reporting (Ball 2001) .
Empirical studies show that the transition to IFRS has not been easy or without problems and has been aggravated by the lack of preparedness of firms and accountants (Spathis & Georgakopoulou 2007) . Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) Although Greece was not prepared for the adoption of IFRS, the widespread belief is that the adoption has increased reliability, transparency and comparability of financial statements (Ballas et al. 2010 ). Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) examined the post-adoption effects of the implementation of IFRS in Greece and found that the effects in the official year of adoption appear to be unfavourable but improve significantly in the subsequent period.
Karampinis and Hevas (2011) reveal that IFRS had only minor impact on the value relevance and conditional conservatism of accounting income, suggesting that simultaneous infrastructure changes are required in order to make any material improvements in financial reporting. 7 Ball (2006) argues that integration has occurred, notably in the capital and product markets, but most market and political forces are local and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
The audit market
Corporate auditing was first introduced in Greece in 1955 with the establishment of the state- Commission (HCMC), ELTE strived to create a robust supervisory body in order to alleviate concerns over audit quality and the credibility of financial reporting. Unfortunately, ELTE has received considerable criticism because it has not yet become an effective enforcement mechanism. In the Greek environment of weak disciplinary authorities and low probability of litigation by third parties, concerns over auditors' potential opportunistic behaviour still remain.
Auditor's report
With the implementation of IFRS and the new auditing rules, the form and content of the auditor's report has been modified. Auditors are obliged to express one of the following opinions on the financial statements, in the opinion paragraph of the report: (1) unqualified opinion, (2) qualified opinion, with matters that do not affect the auditor's overall opinion, (3) qualified opinion, with matters that do affect the auditor's overall opinion, (4) adverse opinion, and (5) disclaimer of opinion.
It should be mentioned that a particularity of the Greek auditor's report is that there is not a clear distinction between unqualified and qualified opinions, apart from the adverse opinion, where the auditor's verdict is clearly stated. For instance, a qualified opinion can include, in the explanatory paragraph, remarks about matters that both 'affect' and 'do not affect the auditor's overall opinion'. However, it could end with a phrase such as '… with the exception of the consequences of the above issues, in our opinion, the aforementioned financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the firm as of 31 December 20XX.. .' Thus, it is in the subjective judgment of the user to decide whether or not the remarks are materially important, and whether or not they should be taken into consideration.
Lately, there is growing concern that firms have established the practice of not performing or undervaluing specific estimates, such as tax liabilities, lawsuits in progress, bad debts, and due liabilities. If these estimates were taken into consideration or valued more realistically, they would reduce considerably reported earnings. In a content analysis of audit reports, Grant Thornton (2010) Another stream of research finds that qualified reports do not mean per se higher audit quality (Arnedo et al. 2008; Butler et al. 2004; Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley 2002) . In the negotiation process before the issuance of the audit report, the auditor discusses with management any material misstatements or departures from GAAP, and requests that management make the relevant adjustments (Butler et al. 2004 ). Higher quality auditors are regarded as the ones that get the client's errors booked before the issue of the audit report. In that case, a lower level of discretionary accruals should be expected, and thus the issuance of an unqualified opinion.
In Greece, where the auditor's incentives are not the same as in common law countries, this argument may not hold. The negotiation process is performed at a different level and it is likely that management will refuse to adjust the financial statements. Then, the auditor has two choices, either to give in to client pressure and issue an unqualified report, waving material errors and/or departures from GAAP, or issue a qualified report. In the second case, the vagueness of the Greek audit report gives options for qualification, leaving both parties satisfied. Auditors can issue the 'qualified opinion, with matters that do not affect the auditor's overall opinion' as an alternative to the more severe types of qualified opinions.
In this way they reduce the possibility of either dissatisfying or losing their clients, and at the same time, they avoid the case of not issuing a qualified report at all. Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
H 2 : In Greece, the audit opinion (unqualified vs. qualified) is not associated with discretionary accruals, other things being equal.
The final hypothesis investigates whether the type of audit opinion issued is related to the size of the audit firm. Past studies argue that since Big 4 audit firms are of higher quality, they are more likely than non-Big 4 firms to report earnings management, when they detect it, by issuing qualified audit reports ( We expect that if audit quality is the same for both types of audit firms, as stated in Hypothesis 1, there should also be no differentiation in the audit qualification; Big 4 auditors are equally likely to issue qualified opinions as non-Big 4 auditors. Building on the same arguments of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we form our last hypothesis as follows:
H 3 : In Greece, the audit opinion type (unqualified vs. qualified) is not associated with the size of the audit firm (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), other things being equal.
Research design
Estimation of discretionary accruals
For the purpose of our analysis, we use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. The manipulation of accruals to move underlying profits towards some desired level of earnings is a favoured instrument of earnings management. Because accruals are components of earnings that are not reflected in current cash flows, they have no direct cash flow consequence and are relatively difficult to detect (Peasnell et al. 2005) . Researchers usually separate discretionary components from total accruals, by subtracting nondiscretionary accruals, to examine the degree of earnings management. An important problem with this approach is the difficulty in separating operating accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components.
The most frequently used model in the literature for the estimation of discretionary accruals is the Jones (1991) model. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) developed the modified-Jones model, which is designed to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones (1991) model to measure discretionary accruals with error when managerial discretion is exercised over revenues (Bartov et al. 2000) . To test our hypotheses, we rely on two alternative models in order to ensure the robustness of our results: 1) the modified-Jones model with cash flow from operations (Larcker & Richardson 2004) , and 2) the modifiedJones model with prior-year return on assets .
Discretionary accruals are usually estimated using time-series data of the same firm or cross-sectional data of the industry that the sample firm belongs to (Jeong & Rho 2004 ).
According to Larcker and Richardson (2004) , the time-series approach assumes temporal stationarity of parameter estimates, whereas the cross-sectional approach assumes homogeneity across firms in the same industry. For the purposes of our study, we adopt the cross-sectional approach. An advantage of using this approach is that specific year changes in economic conditions affecting expected accruals are filtered out since the model is reestimated every year (Johl, Jubb, & Houghton 2007 ). The two cross-sectional discretionary accruals models applied are described below.
Modified-Jones model with CFO
The first measure of discretionary accruals, DA CFO , is obtained from Larcker and
Richardson (2004), who added CFO to the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in an effort to reduce measurement errors, as follows:
where for firm i year t, TA it = total accruals 8 ;
A it-1 = total assets (year t-1);
ΔREV it = change in net revenues from year t-1 to year t;
ΔREC it = change in net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t;
PPE it = property, plant and equipment;
CFO it = cash flow from operations; ε it = random error term
The estimated discretionary accruals, DA CFO , are the difference between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the accruals from model (1). A higher level of discretionary accruals, positive or negative, indicates a greater level of earnings management.
Modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA
The second measure of discretionary accruals, DA ROA , is obtained by applying the model developed by , who stated that accruals of firms that have 8 Total accruals are calculated using the cash flow approach proposed by Hribar and Collins (2002) as an alternative to balance sheet approach, defined as operating income minus operating cash flows.
experienced unusual performance are expected to be systematically non zero, and thus firm performance is correlated with accruals. They added current-year ROA and prior-year ROA to the modified-Jones model as additional controls for performance. Formally, the second model, which adjusts for performance by including prior-year ROA, is as follows:
TA it /A it-1 = β 0 + β 1t (1/A it-1 ) + β 2t ((ΔREV it -ΔREC it ) / A it-1 ) + β 3t (PPE it /A it-1 ) + β 4t
The definitions of the variables are the same as for model (1) with the inclusion of ROA it-1 , which is prior year net income divided by prior year total assets. Again, the estimated discretionary accruals, DA ROA , are the difference between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the accruals from model (2). Trees, Neural Networks and Bayesian Networks, and showed that financial distress and profitability are strongly related to qualified reports. Becker et al. 1998; Dechow et al. 1995) . We include the natural logarithm of total assets, SIZE, to control for the firm size effect on discretionary accruals ( Our earnings management model is specified as follows:
Empirical models
DA it = β 0 + β 1 BIGN it + β 2 CFO it + β 3 SIZE it + β 4 LEV it + β 5 LOSS it + β 6 CR it +β 7 INV it
where for firm i at year t, DA it = signed discretionary accruals; estimated using models (1) and (2) 
where, AO it = dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion, i.e. qualified opinion, with matters that do not affect the auditor's overall opinion, qualified opinion, with matters that do affect the auditor's overall opinion, and adverse opinion, and 0
otherwise. There was no disclaimer of opinion in our sample.
We apply the same control variables as in model (3) clients are more likely to fail and face going concern problems, which increase the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. However, the threat of litigation cost in failures of large clients may condition auditors to be conservative in their opinions and qualify (Frost 1994) .
LEV is used to control for the impact of financial risk on the issuance of a qualified opinion; a high leverage ratio indicates higher financial risk, and thus, higher probability of a 
2006
). We expect this variable to be positively correlated with the issuance of a qualified opinion.
Sample selection and data
The initial population from which the sample is chosen comprises firms listed on the ASE for 10 For listed firms satisfying certain criteria, the audit is conducted by two auditors. When this is the case, one auditor may belong to a Big 4 audit firm and the other to a non-Big 4, making the categorization difficult.
11 www.ase.gr In Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the discrete variable LOSS (current year losses) are shown in Table 3 , where 204 of the 275 firms with current year losses were audited by non-Big 4 audit firms (chi-square = 10.061, p < 0.000). Examination of the table also shows that 133 of the 275 firms with losses in the current year received a qualified opinion. The difference between the two groups of firms reported is significant (chi-square = 15.788, p < 0.000).
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
( Table 3 About Here) Since there is no correlation coefficient higher than 0.8, multicollinearity does not seem to cause problems in the multivariate analysis (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee 1988) , where the simultaneous effect of these variables will be examined.
Regression results for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 tests the association between discretionary accruals, DA CFO ( Table 5 About Here)
We are primarily concerned with the sign and significance of the coefficient β 1 . In The interpretation of this result, however, is subject to the particular characteristics of the economic environment and institutional setting of Greece. Possible reasons are the economic bonding of auditors with their clients, especially when the client is large. In fact, it appears that the economic incentives encourage them to retain existing clients, and attract new clients, by compromising independence in judgment. The incentive is stronger, than the possibility of penalties they would pay by providing low, rather than, high quality audits. This argument is reinforced by the fact that audit firms operate in a relatively small market where investor protection is low, enforcement mechanisms are weak and there is low litigation and reputation loss.
The variance in discretionary accruals is better explained by client financial characteristics. CFO is significant at the 1% level in both models (3a) and (3b). As predicted, it is negatively related to discretionary accruals, a finding consistent with previous studies LOSS is significant at the 1% significance level and is negatively associated with DA for nearly all years, in both, (3a) and (3b), models. Finally, and mainly in model (3a), LEV is negatively associated with discretionary accruals (consistent with Iatridis & Rouvolis 2010; Chen et al. 2005; Kim et al. 2003 , Becker et al. 1998 ). The explanatory power of model (3) is satisfactory and explains much of the dependent variable, with an adjusted R 2 ranging from 18.1% to 74.4%.
In Section 7.1, we perform an additional analysis with positive and negative discretionary accruals samples because discretionary accruals can imply two distinct situations, with either upwards or downwards earnings management incentives.
Regression results for Hypotheses 2 and 3
The results of the logistic regression model (4) are presented in Table 6 . Both models, (4a) and (4b), give similar results because their only difference is the independent variable of discretionary accruals, DA CFO and DA ROA , which is not significant. (Table 6 About Here)
With respect to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient β 1 is negative but, as predicted, not significant, at all significance levels in both (4a) and (4b) models, which implies that discretionary accruals do not provide any help in explaining the type of audit opinion issued by the audit firm. Taking the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2 together, we find that the size of the audit firm does not affect the level of earnings management, and the audit opinion qualification is not issued in response to management's opportunistic behaviour. . Pseudo R-Square 14 ranges from 10.2% to 34.2% and implies a relatively strong relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
Sensitivity tests
To test whether the relationships examined are affected by our design choices, we perform a series of additional sensitivity tests.
Positive vs. negative discretionary accruals
We divide our sample into positive and negative discretionary accruals to investigate if our results differ when managers have incentives to either overstate reported earnings, through income-increasing accruals, or to understate reported earnings through incomedecreasing accruals (see Jenkins, Kane, & Velury 2006; Othman & Zeghal 2006; Kim et al. 2003; Myers et al. 2003) . The results of model (3) in Table 7 indicate that auditor size does not have any effect on constraining upwards or downwards earnings management of the client firm (Othman & Zeghal, 2006) ; the coefficient of BIGN is not significant for either the positive or negative discretionary accruals samples, and Hypothesis 1 is accepted.
( Table 7 About Here)
With respect to the control variables, our analysis reveals that firms with strong operating cash flows are less likely to use either positive or negative discretionary accruals, as the coefficient CFO is significantly negative for both samples. The coefficient on LEV is significantly positive in the positive discretionary accruals sample and significantly negative in the negative discretionary accruals sample, indicating that firms with increased leverage 14 Nagelkerke R-Square manage earnings upwards. In both samples, current year losses, LOSS, are linked to a lower magnitude of earnings-management behaviour.
In Table 8 , consistent with our main analysis in Section 6.3, we find that Hypothesis 2 is accepted. Hypothesis 3 is also rejected, as BIGN is negatively significant in both samples.
Finally, SIZE (negative coefficient) and LEV (positive coefficient) are significant only for the negative discretionary accruals sample, which reveals that smaller firms and firms with high leverage are more likely to receive qualified opinions.
( Table 8 About Here)
Additional discretionary accrual models
To check the robustness of the estimation of discretionary accruals, we re-run models (3) and (4) using discretionary accruals estimated by two additional models: the Jones model (1991) and the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) . 15 The use of these accrual measurements does not yield considerably different results to those reported in Section 6.
Regarding model (3), the test variable BIGN is not significant in explaining DA, both DA J and DA mJ . This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1. LOSS, LEV and CFO coefficients are, again, negative and significant at the 1% level in both DA J and DA mJ models for the full and annual samples. As for model (4), the results are similar to those reported in Section 6. For brevity, we do not report the analytical tables of the results.
Excluding CFO from models (3) and (4)
The variable CFO is used to estimate discretionary accruals in model (1) of our empirical analysis. We drop this variable from models (3) and (4) to check the robustness of our results. We find that BIGN, again, is not significant (Hypothesis 1 accepted) and LOSS is negatively associated with DA at the 1% significance level for models (3a) and (3b).
Hypothesis 2 is again accepted. Once more, the BIGN variable is strongly and negatively associated with AO at the 1% significance level for models (4a) and (4b), and thus Hypothesis 3 is rejected. Additionally, SIZE (negative coefficient) and LEV (positive coefficient) are 15 DA Jit or DA mJit = β 0 + β 1 BIGN it + β 2 CFO it + β 3 SIZE it + β 4 LEV it + β 5 LOSS it + β 6 CR it + β 7 INV it + ε it (for model 3), where DA j is discretionary accruals, estimated using the Jones model (1991), and DA mj is discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) .
AO it = β 0 + β 1 (DA Jit or DA mJit ) + β 2 BIGN it + β 3 CFO it + β 4 SIZE it + β 5 LEV it + β 6 LOSS it + β 7 CR it + β 8 INV it + ε it (for model 4) associated with AO at the 1% significance level. In sum, the results are similar to those reported in our main analysis, supporting the strength of our tests. For brevity, we do not report the analytical tables of the results.
Conclusions, limitations and future research
This study investigated the role of auditors in potentially approving managers' opportunistic behaviour, i.e. earnings management, in the post-IFRS period from 2005 to 2009. As a proxy for earnings management we used discretionary accruals, and as proxies for auditor reporting, we used audit firm size (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) and audit opinion type (unqualified vs. auditors and large clients is even stronger, encouraging auditors to act less conservatively.
Finally, apart from size, leverage also explains the audit qualification.
We conclude that, despite improvements in reliability, transparency, comparability conditional conservatism and value relevance with the implementation of IFRS, especially for large firms, as evidenced in the literature (Ballas et al., 2010; Iatridis & Rouvolis, 2010; Karampinis & Hevas, 2011) , the particular characteristics of the Greek context still influence auditor and financial reporting.
Our results are subject to the limitations of similar empirical studies. First, accrual models have received repeated criticism for providing biased and noisy estimates of discretion (Stubben, 2010 ) and researchers are not in consensus on the superiority or higher reliability of any particular model (Bartov et al., 2000; Bernard & Skinner, 1996; Dechow et al., 1995; Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996; Table 3 Chi-square test of the discrete variable LOSS. ; BIGN: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; CFO: cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total assets; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise CR: current assets divided by current liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets; * Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. ; BIG N: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; CFO: cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total assets; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise CR: current assets divided by current liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets;
